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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge: 
 
Prior to 1985, the retail sale of beer in the Pittsburgh 
area was conducted exclusively by "mom and pop"-type 
beer distributorships, such as those operated by plaintiff 
Michael W. Callahan and his fifteen co-plaintiffs. In that 
year, defendant David Trone opened the first "Beer World" 
store, a supermarket-style beer distributorship ten times 
the size of the traditional stores. He opened four more such 
stores in the Pittsburgh area between 1986 and 1988, 
offering a larger selection and lower prices. This case 
involves antitrust and RICO claims arising out of the 
manner in which Trone operated these stores. 
 
The Pennsylvania Liquor Code limits the ability of one 
entrepreneur to own or operate more than one beer 
distributorship. Trone apparently evaded these restrictions 
by placing the Beer World stores in the names of others, 
and, while acting as a "consultant," effectively running the 
stores himself. According to the plaintiffs, Trone deceived 
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (LCB) as to the true 
state of affairs by filing of false statements and affidavits. 
 
Trone negotiated purchases of beer from wholesalers for 
all of the Beer World stores collectively. By doing so, the 
stores were able to purchase at a wholesale price lower 
than they would have been able to obtain in individual 
purchases. Central to this case are Trone's negotiations 
with defendant Frank Fuhrer, the master distributor in the 
Pittsburgh area for Anheuser-Busch and Coors, in the 
course of which Trone allegedly forced Fuhrer to agree to 
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give a quantity discount to the Beer World stores based on 
their purchases as a group, but not to give this discount to 
any other retailers.1 Trone is said to have been able to do 
this because the Beer World stores held a substantial 
portion (at least 25%) of the Pittsburgh beer market, and 
because he threatened to place Fuhrer's products poorly 
within the stores. The Beer World stores allegedly received 
this discount even though their orders in the aggregate did 
not always reach the 4500-case level Fuhrer set for the 
discount. According to the plaintiffs, this discount was not 
disclosed to anyone else; it was not included on Fuhrer's 
ordinary price list and was excluded from loading sheets 
posted at Fuhrer's distribution center. Not surprisingly, the 
Beer World stores' advantage in pricing, as well as other 
areas, cut sharply into the business of the smaller stores. 
 
This state of affairs has spawned this unusual antitrust 
and civil RICO case with state tort law claims appended, 
brought by the plaintiffs against Trone, the Beer World 
stores, and Fuhrer.2 The plaintiffs' antitrust theory is that 
Trone, his employees, and the separately incorporated 
stores have contracted, combined and conspired to restrain 
trade in beer in Allegheny County, by confronting 
wholesalers as a group and using their buying power and 
the threats described above to force the wholesalers to sell 
them beer at a price lower than that available to other 
retailers. The plaintiffs' RICO theory is that Trone and 
others, by submitting false statements and affidavits to the 
LCB, as well as lying to a grand jury to cover up these false 
statements, were able to maintain illegal consolidated 
control of the Beer World stores. The plaintiffs submit that, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Several other master distributors were involved in similar 
arrangements with the defendants. Although they were apparently 
named in the original complaint, they have now settled with the plaintiffs 
and are no longer participating in this case. 
 
2. The Beer World stores are separately incorporated and named in the 
complaint as A.E.V., Inc., Beer and Pop Warehouse, Inc., Jet Distributor, 
Inc., Q.F.A., Inc., and Red Sky, Inc., all of which operate under the Beer 
World name. Trone is named personally in the complaint, along with the 
consulting business he runs, Retail Services and Systems, Inc. Fuhrer 
includes both Frank B. Fuhrer, Jr. himself and his business, Frank B. 
Fuhrer Wholesale Co. 
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as a result of this control, Trone and the Beer World stores 
obtained the advantages that enabled them to sell beer at 
prices below that of the plaintiffs. Although in a free 
market, these different approaches to operating a beer 
distributorship might not seem to offer grounds for a 
federal antitrust or civil RICO suit, in the context of 
Pennsylvania's detailed malt and brewed beverages 
regulatory scheme, the plaintiffs have found grounds for a 
lawsuit. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on all claims, including both the state tort law 
claims and the federal claims, and the plaintiffs have 
appealed. Strangely, antitrust liability issues are not 
presented in this appeal. The District Court, in deciding the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, did not 
consider antitrust liability issues at all; rather, the District 
Court disposed of the antitrust and RICO claims on the 
ground that the plaintiffs had not produced sufficient 
evidence that they suffered actual losses that were in fact 
a result of the defendants' actions. Accordingly, and given 
the incomplete state of the record as presented to us by the 
parties, we do not intend to engage in an examination of 
the nature and scope of the plaintiffs' theory or proof of 
antitrust violations (and, consequently, we express no view 
as to their correctness). Instead, we will assume, for the 
purposes of this appeal, that the plaintiffs can offer 
sufficient proof that the defendants engaged in antitrust 
violations throughout the relevant time periods. We will 
accordingly concentrate on the issues -- actual loss and 
causation in fact (termed "fact of damage") with respect to 
the antitrust claims, and proximate causation with respect 
to the RICO claim -- that are fairly presented by this 
appeal. 
 
In order to prove that the plaintiffs suffered losses and 
that the defendants' antitrust violations caused the injuries 
as a matter of fact, the plaintiffs offered (1) testimony that 
various customers no longer came to their stores and that 
the customers explained that this was because the Beer 
World stores offered cheaper prices, along with (2) the 
report of an expert who opined that the defendants' actions 
had caused harm to the plaintiffs. The defendants contend 
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that this evidence is insufficient to meet the plaintiffs' 
burden of production. They first submit that the plaintiffs' 
anecdotal evidence is inadmissible hearsay on which the 
plaintiffs cannot rely. We disagree. The plaintiffs themselves 
can testify that the customers are in fact no longer 
shopping at their stores. Furthermore, although the reports 
of the customers' statements are hearsay, they are 
admissible as evidence of the customers' states of mind, 
i.e., their reasons for no longer shopping at the plaintiffs' 
stores. This combined evidence is sufficient to meet the 
plaintiffs' burden of producing enough evidence of loss and 
causation with respect to the plaintiffs' antitrust claims to 
overcome a motion for summary judgment. 
 
Also on the antitrust issues, the defendants argue that 
the plaintiffs' proffered expert testimony is inadequate to 
prove fact of injury and causation because, inter alia, the 
expert failed to discuss numerous other possible causes of 
the plaintiffs' losses. Furthermore, the defendants challenge 
the expert's methodology for estimating the amount of 
damages. In spite of these flaws, we conclude that the 
expert's testimony is sufficient to meet the plaintiffs' burden 
of proof. At all events -- taking into consideration both the 
customer evidence and the expert reports-- we believe that 
the District Court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' 
antitrust claims on the ground that there was inadequate 
proof of fact of injury and causation in fact. 
 
With respect to the RICO claim, the defendants contend 
that the alleged causal connection between the defendants' 
fraud and the plaintiffs' losses is not sufficiently close to 
meet the requirement of proximate causation. The plaintiffs' 
RICO claim runs as follows: If Trone and others associated 
with the Beer World stores had not defrauded the 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board by submitting sworn 
statements that Trone did not own and control all of the 
stores, the Liquor Control Board would have put Trone out 
of business. Since he stayed in business, Trone was able to 
use his control of several stores to obtain volume discounts 
by buying for the stores in the aggregate. The plaintiffs were 
then harmed by the defendants' ability to sell at lower 
prices. 
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We think this case is similar to Steamfitters Local Union 
No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 
(3d Cir. 1999), in which we recently held that the plaintiffs 
had failed to prove proximate causation. In Steamfitters, we 
recognized three factors the Supreme Court has identified 
for determining proximate causation in RICO cases: the 
directness of the injury, the difficulty of apportioning treble 
damages among potential plaintiffs, and the possibility of 
other plaintiffs vindicating the goals of RICO. Given that the 
plaintiffs are relatively remote third-party "victims" of the 
fraud and that the LCB itself, or the wholesalers, could take 
steps to counter the defendants' allegedly illegal actions, we 
think the plaintiffs' claim meets none of the factors. 
Accordingly, we believe that the District Court properly 
dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claim, although not for the 
appropriate reason. For these reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court to the extent it dismissed the 
plaintiffs' RICO claim, but reverse its judgment with respect 
to the antitrust claims. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. The Pennsylvania Beer Sales Regulation Scheme 
 
Pennsylvania is a state in which temperance with respect 
to alcoholic beverages has always been an important policy, 
and statutory regulation of alcoholic beverage sales is 
extensive. The best known example, of course, is the"state 
store" system, under which liquor can only be sold in state- 
owned stores. With respect to malt and brewed beverages 
there is likewise a panoply of regulations. See, e.g., Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 47, S 4-441(b) (West 1997) (prohibiting sales 
in units smaller than one case); S 4-447 (limiting sellers' 
ability to change prices); S 4-492(2) (prohibiting sales by 
licensees for consumption on the premises); S 4-492(4) 
(prohibiting sales on Sunday); S 4-493(2) (prohibiting credit 
sales of alcoholic beverages other than by credit card); S 4- 
493(3) (prohibiting exchange of alcoholic beverages for 
goods or services); S 4-493(8) (prohibiting the use of labels 
or advertisements containing the alcoholic content of 
brewed or malt beverages). 
 
For present purposes, we are concerned with the 
regulation of beer sales. Under Pennsylvania law, beer 
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sellers are divided into four classes for licensing purposes: 
manufacturers, master distributors, importing distributors 
and distributors. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, S 4-431 (West 
1997). The first category consists of breweries. An out-of- 
state brewer is required to designate a particular importing 
distributor as the master distributor for a particular 
geographic area within which only that master distributor 
is permitted to buy that brewer's beer directly from the 
brewer. See S 4-431(b). Thus, any beer sold in a particular 
area must at some point pass through the master 
distributor designated for that brand in that area. A master 
distributor can sell beer to importing distributors, 
(ordinary) distributors or the public. An importing 
distributor can also sell beer either to other importing 
distributors, (ordinary) distributors or the public. A 
distributor can only sell beer to the public. The Beer World 
stores all have importing distributor licenses, and can 
therefore sell to each other and to the public. Only some of 
the plaintiffs have such licenses. 
 
Highly relevant here is the extent to which Pennsylvania 
law limits the ability of a participant -- e.g., a partner, 
member or shareholder -- in one beer distributor to 
participate in another. See S 4-438 ("No person shall 
possess more than one class of license . . . .");S 4-443 
(prohibiting interlocking ownership in various forms). In 
particular, the law restricts the ability of an individual to 
participate in companies that operate at the same level, 
although the parties debate the extent to which the law 
does so. See S 4-438(b) ("No person shall possess or be 
issued more than one distributor's or importing 
distributor's license."); S 4-436(e) (application for brewed or 
malt beverage license must state "[t]hat the applicant is 
not, or in case of a partnership or association, that the 
members are not, or in the case of a corporation, that the 
officers or directors are not, in any manner pecuniarily 
interested, either directly or indirectly, in the profits of any 
other class of business regulated under this article, excepts 
as hereinafter permitted"); S 4-436(f) (applicant must state 
"[t]hat applicant is the only person in any manner 
pecuniarily interested in the business so asked to be 
licensed . . . ."). 
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B. Trone's Beer Business Arrangements 
 
Trone's family had been in the beer business in 
Harrisburg and Pittsburgh for some time. While a business 
student at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, 
Trone apparently came up with a plan for a new type of 
beer distributorship business. Prior to his plan, beer 
distributors were typically small, low-capitalization "mom- 
and-pop" stores of the kind operated by the plaintiffs. They 
usually had ordinary distributor licenses and operated 
relatively small stores, selling beer by having people come 
in and ask for a particular brand. Trone's idea was to 
create much larger stores, roughly ten times the square 
footage of the plaintiffs' stores, to be operated like a 
supermarket. The cases of beer would be set out on shelves 
so that shoppers could wander through the store picking 
out particular brands themselves. In addition, Trone 
planned to offer soda and snacks in addition to the beer. 
This business plan became the "Beer World" concept.3 We 
chronicle the history and management structure of the 
stores because it bears on the contention that Trone 
improperly controls all of the stores in violation of the 
Pennsylvania liquor control scheme, an important part of 
the plaintiffs' antitrust and RICO claims. 
 
The first Beer World opened in the Pittsburgh area in 
1985. Two more stores opened in Pittsburgh in 1986, 
followed by the last two in 1987 and 1988. The first store, 
incorporated as Jet Distributors, Inc., is apparently owned 
by Paul Piho, a childhood friend of Trone's. Piho initially 
worked full-time in Chicago after the store opened. For a 
short time, he moved to Pittsburgh and managed the store. 
Currently, he works at a Delaware branch of a chain of 
liquor stores apparently owned by Trone. The second store 
is apparently owned by Trone's wife, who for a time worked 
at the store, but presently spends less than five hours per 
week there. The third is apparently owned by Thomas 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It might seem surprising that Trone was thefirst to come up with the 
beer supermarket concept. Indeed, one might think that it would have 
been around for decades. Perhaps he was simply thefirst to bring this 
idea to Pennsylvania. At all events, these ruminations have no bearing 
on the outcome of this case. 
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Esper, a retired schoolteacher who apparently knows little 
about either the store or the liquor business. The fourth 
store is apparently owned by Trone's sister, who has been 
in school or working at other jobs for the relevant period. 
Before 1990 and since 1994, she has lived outside of 
Pennsylvania. The last store was apparently owned by 
Albert Vivio, the father of one of Trone's employees. He 
stated that he did not pay anything to own the store, but 
that Trone asked him to put his name on a license. He 
testified that he had "no duties at the store," pursuant to 
an "agreement with Mr. Trone." 
 
Since the Beer World stores opened, Trone has been 
employed as a "consultant" for all of them. The plaintiffs 
allege, however, that Trone's role in the stores is much 
greater. When the stores opened, he did much of the work 
in preparing the stores, choosing product line and layout, 
and selecting employees. He also set up purchasing and 
delivery systems. Since then, Trone has apparently 
controlled the day-to-day operations of the stores. He set 
the salaries for Beer World employees. Employees were 
routinely moved from store to store while remaining on the 
payroll of the store in which they began. Although each 
store maintains a separate bank account in the owner's 
name, Trone has a stamp of each owner's signature which 
he uses for checks. He also designed all the advertising for 
the stores, which included aggressive price advertising until 
July 1, 1987, when Pennsylvania banned it. And he 
determined purchasing and product placement within the 
stores. Finally, Trone purchased a single insurance policy 
and used one law firm for all of the stores. 
 
Of particular relevance to the plaintiffs' claims are 
Trone's efforts in coordinating purchasing. Trone negotiated 
purchases of beer from wholesalers for all of the Beer World 
stores at once, obtaining an agreement that the Beer World 
stores could order together in order to obtain substantial 
volume discounts. The parties focus particularly on the 
negotiations between Trone and Fuhrer, who was the 
master distributor in the Pittsburgh area for Anheuser- 
Busch and Coors. All of Fuhrer's negotiations regarding the 
prices he would charge Beer World stores were conducted 
with Trone. 
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Even before the Beer World stores opened, beer 
wholesalers offered various quantity discounts, although 
they were relatively small. From September 1, 1987, until 
the end of 1989, pursuant to an agreement with Trone, 
Fuhrer implemented a $.25 per case discount for purchases 
of 4500 or more cases, a purchase amount substantially 
larger than that required for other, smaller volume 
discounts wholesalers offered. The Beer World stores were 
the only ones ever able to achieve this level of purchasing, 
which they did by ordering as a unit. Although each store 
would place separate orders that were delivered separately, 
they were placed in the name of Jet Distributors, one of the 
stores, in order to aggregate the order size to reach the 
4500 case level. Each store's order was substantially less 
than this, usually in the range of 1000 cases. Although the 
plaintiffs attempted to take advantage of this discount, they 
were never able or permitted to do so. 
 
Although the parties focus primarily on these quantity 
discounts, the plaintiffs allege that Trone was also able to 
obtain other benefits for the Beer World stores from 
wholesalers. For example, Fuhrer allegedly gave the Beer 
World stores a full-time employee, paid by Fuhrer, who 
stocked shelves at all of the stores. The plaintiffs further 
contend that Trone forced Fuhrer to sell him out-of-code 
beer, i.e., beer past its expiration/freshness date, at a 
discount. Apparently state law prohibits this and requires 
wholesalers to give retailers new beer in exchange for out- 
of-code beer. Trone allegedly got such beer at a discount 
and sold it while concealing the fact that it had expired 
from customers and inspectors sent by the beer brewers. 
 
The plaintiffs criticize several aspects of these 
arrangements. First of all, they contend that Trone forced 
Fuhrer to agree not to give the discount to any other 
retailers. He allegedly could do so because, since the Beer 
World stores held a substantial portion (at least 25%) of the 
Pittsburgh beer market, Trone's threat to place Fuhrer's 
products in unfavorable locations within the stores carried 
force. Second, the plaintiffs point out that the Beer Worlds 
consistently received this discount even though their orders 
in the aggregate did not always reach the 4500-case level. 
In addition, many of the individual orders were fairly small: 
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29% were below 500 cases and 14% were below 200 cases, 
roughly the level at which the plaintiffs ordered. Finally, 
this discount was not disclosed to anyone else; it was not 
even included on Fuhrer's ordinary price lists. 
 
In response to the defendants' actions, the plaintiffs 
instituted a state lawsuit against the defendants and 
convinced the Commonwealth to commence criminal 
proceedings. Neither of these actions achieved their desired 
results. 
 
C. The Present Lawsuit 
 
The plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit in March of 1992. 
Their primary claims include price fixing, engaging in a 
group boycott, and attempting and conspiring to 
monopolize the beer market in Pittsburgh, all in violation of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1 & 2, and civil RICO claims 
predicated on money laundering and mail fraud in 
connection with the license applications to the LCB, said to 
be a violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1341, 1956, 1962. They also 
brought various other claims that have been dismissed and 
not appealed or that we may dispose of summarily. 4 
Although the plaintiffs moved for class certification, this 
motion was denied, at which point some additional 
plaintiffs joined the suit. 
 
The antitrust claims arise out of the joint operation of the 
Beer World stores. The plaintiffs contend that, by operating 
as a group, the Beer World stores were able to obtain an 
illegal competitive advantage. As evidence of such joint 
operation, they point to inter alia Trone's collective control 
of the stores, the aggregated orders through Jet 
Distributing, and coordinated advertising. The plaintiffs 
contend that this conduct violated the antitrust laws in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. These claims include price discrimination in violation of the Robinson- 
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13; common-law fraud; common-law conspiracy 
to defraud; and RICO violations predicated on mail fraud in the mailing 
of price lists by Fuhrer, 18 U.S.C. SS 1341, 1962. The Robinson-Patman 
Act claim was dismissed early on, and the plaintiffs have not appealed 
from that dismissal. See Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-556, 
1994 WL 682756 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1994). The plaintiffs' others claims 
are discussed in infra note 7. 
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several ways. First, the "quantity" discounts the Beer World 
stores were able to obtain are said to have constituted 
unfair price fixing, i.e., the price for other beer distributors 
was fixed at a level $.25 higher than that for the Beer World 
stores. Second, the discounts are claimed to have resulted 
in a group boycott, i.e., Beer World convinced the 
wholesalers to sell to the other distributors only on unfairly 
disadvantageous terms. Finally, the plaintiffs allege that all 
of the actions of Trone and the Beer World stores 
constituted an effort to monopolize the beer retail market in 
Allegheny County, which includes Pittsburgh. These efforts 
were aggravated by the fact that, pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Liquor Code, the plaintiffs could only 
purchase beer through the single, designated master 
distributor for each brand for Allegheny County. 
 
The RICO claim arises out of the various statements 
made during and concerning the Beer Worlds' efforts to 
obtain licenses from the LCB. First, various of the 
defendants and others allegedly lied about the true 
ownership of the Beer World stores in affidavits and other 
documents filed with the LCB via mailings in order to 
obtain and retain their licenses. Second, Trone and others 
allegedly lied before a grand jury investigating their 
operation when asked about the ownership of the Beer 
World stores. The plaintiffs contend that, as a result of this 
fraud, the Beer World stores were able to remain in 
business illegally under the control of Trone. Furthermore, 
Trone is said to have engaged in transactions involving the 
proceeds of this fraud, i.e., the income of the stores, by 
reinvesting the money in the stores, allegedly in violation of 
the money laundering statute. The plaintiffs contend that 
these various activities violated RICO. 
 
D. The District Court's Rulings 
 
Following extensive discovery, the parties each moved for 
summary judgment on various of the claims. The plaintiffs 
moved for summary judgment on their RICO claim relating 
to the Trone and Beer World defendants' statements to the 
LCB. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion 
because they did not "provide [any] substantive analysis of 
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the meaning or application of S 1962 or its various 
subsections." Dist. Ct. Op. I, at 3.5  
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of 
the plaintiffs' claims. The District Court, in a series of 
orders, granted the defendants' motions in part and denied 
them in part, and granted judgment in favor of the 
defendants on all of the plaintiffs' claims. First, the District 
Court dismissed part of the plaintiffs' RICO claim on 
statute of limitations grounds to the extent it was based on 
matters that occurred more than four years before the suit 
was filed.6 Second, the District Court dismissed all of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Since we will affirm the District Court's judgment in favor of the 
defendants on the plaintiffs' RICO claim, we need not consider 
specifically whether it erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
6. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the RICO claim to the extent it was based on actions prior 
to March 1988, four years before the present suit was filed, because the 
plaintiffs should have been aware of the defendants' acts prior to that 
time. The plaintiffs contend that the District Court's conclusion 
erroneously rested on the fact that some of themfiled a state lawsuit 
against Trone and the Beer World stores in 1986 alleging similar 
concerns, during which they could have obtained sufficient discovery to 
bring their present claims. They argue that their attorney misled them 
into believing they could not pursue their claim in that context, and that 
the statute of limitations should be tolled equitably. 
 
We recently explained that attorney misconduct can give rise to 
equitable tolling only in unusual circumstances. See Seitzinger v. 
Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). The 
plaintiffs contend that such unusual circumstances are present here, 
because their attorney allegedly was conflicted in that he also 
represented Fuhrer, and because, unlike Seitzinger, the lack of 
information on which to base a claim was at least arguably a result of 
the defendants' fraud. Furthermore, the plaintiffs note that, given the 
tremendous difficulties they faced in obtaining adequate discovery from 
the defendants in this case, the defendants cannot contend that the 
plaintiffs would have been able to obtain sufficient discovery in the 
previous state case. On the other hand, the defendants point out that, 
even if they fraudulently concealed certain facts, the plaintiffs were 
aware of those facts by the end of 1987. We need not decide this issue, 
because we will affirm the District Court's dismissal of the RICO claim 
in its entirety on other grounds. 
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plaintiffs' remaining claims -- the antitrust and RICO 
claims -- because it concluded that the plaintiffs had not 
offered sufficient evidence of fact of damage, i.e., loss and 
causation in fact.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As noted above, the plaintiffs brought additional RICO and common- 
law tort claims. In the same series of orders identified in the text, the 
District Court granted summary judgment on these claims in the 
defendants' favor. We will affirm those aspects of the judgment 
summarily. 
 
The plaintiffs' common-law claims are that Fuhrer issued price lists 
that were fraudulent because they did not state the volume discount the 
Beer World stores received, and that Trone and Fuhrer conspired to 
misrepresent the prices through the same mechanism. Claims for 
common-law fraud and conspiracy are governed by a two-year statute of 
limitations. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5524(7). The discount was 
discontinued at the end of 1989, and the plaintiffs were aware of the 
discount before then. The complaint was filed in March of 1992. 
Accordingly, the District Court concluded that more than two years had 
elapsed between the defendants' fraudulent acts and the filing of the 
complaint, and that the claim was therefore time-barred. Since the 
plaintiffs have not addressed this issue in the briefs (or, apparently, 
before the District Court), and the District Court's decision appears to 
be 
correct, we will affirm the District Court's judgment as to the common- 
law claims summarily. 
 
The other RICO claim was based on Fuhrer's allegedly fraudulent 
mailing of price lists that did not include the $.25/case volume discount 
offered to the Beer Worlds. This discount was begun in September of 
1987. Fuhrer did not mail a price list thereafter until March of 1988, 
and the plaintiffs were aware of the discount by October of that year. 
The District Court analyzed whether this constituted a "pattern of 
racketeering activity," 18 U.S.C. S 1962, in light of long-standing 
precedent. See, e.g., H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 
229, 241 (1989). First, the Court concluded that this was not an open- 
ended pattern because, as Fuhrer discontinued the discount in 1989, 
the alleged fraud was unlikely to recur. Second, the Court found that 
fraud of six months' duration could not constitute a closed-ended 
pattern. See, e.g., Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1293 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("Since H.J., Inc., this court has faced the question of continued 
racketeering activities in several cases, each timefinding that conduct 
lasting no more than twelve months did not meet the standard for 
closed-ended continuity." (citing cases)). Because the plaintiffs could 
prove no pattern of racketeering activity, the District Court concluded 
that they could not bring a successful RICO claim based on the price 
lists. Since the plaintiffs have not discussed this issue in their briefs 
and 
the District Court's reasoning is persuasive, we will affirm the District 
Court's judgment in favor of the defendants on this other RICO claim, 
also summarily. 
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Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Although the plaintiffs must 
prove loss, causation and specific damages, at the 
summary judgment stage, the court's main concern should 
be with determining loss and causation in general, rather 
than proof of specific amounts of damages: 
 
        At this procedural juncture, reviewing the district 
        court's grant of summary judgment, we are not, as we 
        would be upon reviewing a jury verdict, determining 
        whether a plaintiff has brought sufficient evidence to 
        justify the actual damages awarded. Rather, here, all 
        we are concerned with is whether Rossi has 
        established that the defendants' illegal conduct was a 
        material cause of [his] injury. 
 
Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 484 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Stelwagon 
Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1276 
n.19 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining to consider whether the 
plaintiff had offered sufficient proof of the amount of 
damages, since the plaintiffs' proof of loss in general was 
inadequate). 
 
On appeal, our review of a District Court's grant of 
summary judgment is plenary. See In re Baby Food 
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 123 (3d Cir. 1999). "We 
evaluate the evidence using the same standard the District 
Court applied in reaching its decision." 166 F.3d at 123-24.8 
 
II. Antitrust Claims: Antitrust Liability 
 
In the ordinary case, liability is the first question that 
must be decided. Accordingly, we would usually begin our 
analysis of this case with a discussion of whether the 
plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence to prove that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1337 and 1367, as well as 15 U.S.C.S 15. We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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the defendants violated the Sherman Act. Although that 
would appear to be an obvious question in this case, for the 
reasons set forth below we are not presently in a position 
to evaluate the plaintiffs' theory of antitrust liability. We 
will, however, briefly summarize that theory and the 
defendants' arguments against it in order to provide a 
background for our discussion of fact of damage, and for 
the benefit of the District Court and the parties on remand. 
 
The plaintiffs' antitrust claims begin with the premise 
that Trone coordinated the activities of all of the Beer World 
stores. In support of this contention, they note that Trone 
dictated most aspects of store policy, was in charge of 
hiring and managing employees, and had sole control of the 
stores' accounts. In addition, Trone coordinated the stores' 
interactions with other people, including wholesalers and 
customers. He negotiated a single set of wholesale prices for 
all of the Beer World stores. When one wholesaler would 
not agree to a discount, he organized a joint advertising 
campaign among the stores against the wholesaler. He also 
published joint advertising for the stores. 
 
Furthermore, Trone and the stores allegedly conspired 
with wholesalers, Fuhrer in particular, so that the stores 
could obtain a competitive advantage over other retailers. 
Most prominently, the plaintiffs allege that Trone convinced 
Fuhrer to grant the stores a volume discount $.25/case 
lower than that available to any other retailer. This 
discount was concealed from other customers and 
wholesalers in several ways, and denied to the customers 
when they requested it. The Beer World stores' orders 
pursuant to the discount were placed jointly. Furthermore, 
the discount was always given even though the minimum 
order required for the discount was not always met by the 
Beer World stores in the aggregate. In addition, the 
plaintiffs contend that the evidence shows that Fuhrer 
granted the stores other advantages, including special 
delivery terms and assistance in placing beer in the stores. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that the advantages the Beer World 
stores obtained caused losses to the plaintiffs. As a result 
of the advantages, the Beer World stores were able to 
undersell the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the plaintiffs contend, 
they lost customers to the Beer World stores. The plaintiffs 
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submit that these harms were particularly aggravated 
because of the geographical limitations the Liquor Code 
places on distributors. The Code requires that, for each 
brand of beer sold in a particular area, a specific wholesaler 
be designated as the master distributor. A beer retailer 
within that geographic area, must buy that brand either 
from the master distributor, or from someone who bought 
it from the master distributor. Since the plaintiffs allege 
that the defendants were conspiring with the master 
distributors, they were at a particular competitive 
disadvantage. 
 
Although, as noted above, the plaintiffs identify several 
antitrust liability theories, they focus on one in particular 
in their briefs. They argue that the aforementioned actions 
constitute a group boycott on the part of Trone, the Beer 
World stores, and Fuhrer. They contend that Trone 
convinced Fuhrer to agree to sell beer to the Beer World 
stores at a lower price than would be available to any other 
retailer. They rest their legal theory on, inter alia, Klor's, 
Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), 
and Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' theory of 
antitrust liability is untenable for several reasons. First, 
they argue that the plaintiffs' theory is simply a Robinson- 
Patman Act price-discrimination claim recast as a Sherman 
Act claim. They note too that the plaintiffs did bring a 
Robinson-Patman Act claim that was dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds. The defendants also submit that 
price discrimination without much more cannot be a 
violation of the Sherman Act. 
 
We agree that price discrimination simpliciter -- even 
when it violates the Robinson-Patman Act -- is usually not 
a Sherman Act violation. But we do not think this 
necessarily means that the plaintiffs are barred from 
bringing a price discrimination claim under the Sherman 
Act. The plaintiffs' claims are unlike an ordinary price 
discrimination case, in which a single supplier offers 
different prices to different purchasers in order to advance 
its own interests. They allege that Fuhrer was convinced to 
offer different prices in order to advance the defendants' -- 
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the plaintiffs' competitors -- interests. We see no reason 
why price discrimination, under appropriate circumstances, 
could not be part of an agreement in restraint of trade or a 
monopolization attempt. See, e.g., Black Gold, Ltd. v. 
Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 683-84 (10th Cir. 
1984); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 198 (W.D. 
Wash. 1966); McKeon Constr. v. McClatchy Newspapers, 
Civ. No. 51627, 1969 WL 226 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1969). So 
long as the price discrimination involves a conspiracy to 
restrain trade or create a monopoly in some market-- 
along with a substantial effect on competition in the 
market, see J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 
1524, 1541 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Zoslaw v. MCA 
Distributing Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 887 (9th Cir. 1982)); see 
also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 
375 (1967) -- it would violate the Sherman Act. The proper 
evidence in this case might support the conclusion that this 
constituted a conspiracy or agreement to restrain trade or 
create a monopoly, although we express no opinion as to 
whether the plaintiffs have produced such evidence. 
 
The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs cannot 
prove that they engaged in a group boycott. Relying on 
Klor's and Rossi, they submit that a group boycott only 
exists where the defendants' actions result in the product's 
not being available to the plaintiffs at all, or only being 
available at highly unfavorable terms. Of course, when one 
thinks of a boycott, one ordinarily thinks of preventing 
access to something entirely. Moreover, the defendants 
contend that the putative quantity discount is modest. The 
plaintiffs respond, however, that the evidence here is 
sufficient to conclude that, as a result of the defendants' 
actions, beer was only available to them on highly 
unfavorable terms, i.e., $.25/case more than their 
competitors were paying. 
 
Finally, the defendants contend that the antitrust 
violations were limited to a narrow array of conduct, 
specifically the $.25/case discount discussed above. 
Plaintiffs contest this point vigorously. They suggest that, 
solely with respect to Fuhrer, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that he engaged in other activities over a longer 
period of time, including delivery and product placement 
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assistance, that gave the Beer World stores an advantage. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs point to evidence that suggests 
that other wholesalers were giving the Beer World stores 
discounts and other benefits throughout a substantially 
broader time frame. 
 
The District Court did not address these questions of 
antitrust liability because it thought it could dispose of the 
case on other grounds. In part, this may have been because 
the Court came to the case late, upon transfer of the case 
from the docket of another judge.9 In addition, it 
undoubtedly seemed to it to be a more straightforward way 
in which to dispose of the case. We imply no criticism of the 
District Court's approach. As discussed further below, 
however, liability is not an issue that ultimately can be 
avoided in this case. The defendants have suggested that it 
is an appropriate alternative grounds upon which we can 
rest our judgment, but we do not think so. Although the 
parties have set forth in their briefs their legal analyses of 
the liability questions, the record as presented to us is not 
sufficiently adequate for us to give the careful and thorough 
consideration these issues merit. Since the case must go 
back to the District Court, we think these issues would 
benefit from further elaboration there in thefirst instance. 
 
On remand, in determining whether the plaintiffs can 
prove that the defendants violated the Sherman Act, the 
District Court can answer the questions discussed above. 
The Court will be able to determine under which of their 
variegated antitrust theories the plaintiffs may proceed. In 
addition, the Court can clarify the precise temporal scope 
and nature of the defendants' antitrust violations. 
Explication of this last issue in particular will provide a 
better framework for more precise analysis of the questions 
to which we turn next (and which will remain a matter in 
controversy on remand). At this juncture, because of the 
lack of clarity concerning the precise nature and scope of 
the plaintiffs' antitrust liability proofs, we will assume that 
the plaintiffs can prove that the defendants engaged in 
antitrust violations throughout the relevant period. Based 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We also note that the present plaintiffs' counsel came to the case late 
as well, after much of its present contours had beenfixed. 
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on this assumption, we turn to the issue upon which the 
District Court rested its decision: whether the plaintiffs 
have offered sufficient proof of fact of damage. 
 
III. Antitrust Claims: Fact of Damage 
 
The primary issue actually before us on the antitrust 
claims is whether the plaintiffs have proffered sufficient 
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the defendants' alleged antitrust violations caused 
harm to the plaintiffs. "[A] plaintiff must prove a causal 
connection between [the antitrust violation] and actual 
damage suffered." Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing 
Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1273 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Rossi 
v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 483 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("To recover damages, an antitrust plaintiff must prove 
causation, described in our jurisprudence as `fact of 
damage or injury.' " (citations omitted)); II Phillip E. Areeda 
& Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 360c2, at 195 ("The 
plaintiff must show actual injury that was `caused' by the 
violation."). Although we suspect our factual analysis of loss 
and causation would apply equally to both the plaintiffs' 
antitrust and RICO claims, we will focus in this section 
only on the former. We can put the RICO claim to the side 
because, although we are unsure that the District Court's 
reasons for dismissing it was correct, we think they should 
be dismissed for other reasons, i.e., lack of proximate 
causation. 
 
In brief, the plaintiffs' theory of antitrust fact of damage 
is as follows: Trone, the Beer World stores, and Fuhrer 
engaged in various joint actions, including but not limited 
to granting the Beer World stores secret discounts on 
wholesale purchases, which resulted in the plaintiffs' losing 
business. In support of this theory of fact of damage, the 
plaintiffs offer two types of evidence: (1) testimony 
concerning customers who no longer shop at the plaintiffs' 
stores and their statements about their reasons for not 
doing so; and (2) expert opinion testimony concerning the 
cause of the plaintiffs' loss of income. We must decide 
whether the former type of evidence is admissible, and 
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whether either is sufficient, individually or together, to 
establish actual injury and causation in fact.10 
 
A. Customer Evidence 
 
1. Summary of the Evidence: In opposition to the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs 
offered deposition testimony concerning their customers. It 
included testimony of various plaintiffs that certain 
customers ceased purchasing beer from them after the Beer 
World stores opened, and that the customers stated that 
they had done so because the Beer World stores had 
cheaper beer. The District Court concluded that this 
testimony was inadmissible hearsay and therefore could not 
meet the plaintiffs' burden of production to defeat the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
 
Five of the plaintiffs offered testimony concerning 
customers' behavior and statements. This testimony can be 
divided into two categories. First, several of the plaintiffs 
testified that, during the time at issue in this litigation, 
some people who had formerly been their customers 
stopped coming to their stores. Carl Altenhof testified that, 
"Retail customers that I had as steady customers, I don't 
have anymore when Beer World came in . . . ." App. at 750. 
Likewise, Douglas J. Berthold stated in his deposition that, 
although he could not document his losses, he had"lost 
forty percent of [his] business, probably most of them are 
one case purchase customers, some of them two case 
purchase [sic]." App. at 754. Finally, Kathleen Kapres said 
that she lost customers, purportedly to Beer World. App. at 
819. 
 
Second, several of the plaintiffs testified that various 
customers, some identified and some not, told them that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Given our conclusion that the customer and expert evidence of 
causation is sufficient, we need not consider the plaintiffs' other 
arguments for reversing the District Court's conclusion that they had not 
adduced sufficient evidence of causation: (1) that a price differential 
permits an automatic presumption of causation of loss to those who pay 
the higher price, see Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 455 (3d 
Cir. 1977), and (2) that the defendants' own statements and 
"admissions" constitute proof of causation. 
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they no longer shopped at the plaintiffs' stores because of 
the Beer World stores' operations. Berthold testified that 
one customer, David Begg, told him that he was going to 
shop at Beer World because "I like selection" and "money 
talks." App. at 755. Kapres also stated that she"had quite 
a few customers come in and say they wanted the same 
deal [lower prices] from me or they were just going to buy 
their beer from [Beer World], and I said I just can't give you 
that deal." App. at 819. In addition, Paul Kelly identified by 
name three customers of his who began to buy from Beer 
World, and discussed at length conversations with one of 
them in which the customer revealed that he was going to 
Beer World because of the prices. App. at 822-27. 
 
As noted previously, the defendants contend that the 
plaintiffs have presented evidence of antitrust violations at 
most during a fairly brief period of time, for which only 
some of the customer evidence is relevant. The District 
Court did not consider this issue and, as we have stated, 
neither will we. Instead, we assume that the plaintiffs can 
establish antitrust violations throughout the relevant 
period. On remand, the District Court will have to analyze 
the extent of the defendants' antitrust violations and then 
determine whether the plaintiffs' evidence of loss and 
causation remains sufficient in light of the more specific 
temporal scope. If it appears that the defendants did not 
engage in antitrust violations during some of the relevant 
period, the District Court is free to revisit the question 
whether the plaintiffs' proof of causation remains sufficient. 
 
2. Admissibility: The District Court, rely ing on our 
decision in Stelwagon Manufacturing Co. v. Tarmac Roofing 
Systems, Inc., 63 F.3d 1267 (3d Cir. 1995), held this 
evidence inadmissible, finding that the plaintiffs' testimony 
concerning their customers' statements was inadmissible 
hearsay. It also noted that, although this litigation has been 
proceeding for some six years, the plaintiffs had not taken 
the simple step of obtaining affidavits from customers 
concerning their reasons for ceasing to purchase beer from 
the plaintiffs. We disagree with the District Court's reading 
of Stelwagon. 
 
In Stelwagon, the plaintiff proffered the testimony of its 
employees concerning the statements of their customers. 
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The employees proposed to testify, based on "out-of-court 
conversations with Stelwagon customers . . . that the 
customers could and did purchase Tarmac MAPs from 
 780<!>Standard at prices lower than Stelwagon's prices." 
 
Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1274. The plaintiff argued that this 
testimony was admissible to prove fact of damage, i.e., both 
loss and causation, under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), 
which provides: 
 
        The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
        even though the declarant is available as a witness:. . . 
        A statement of declarant's then existing state of mind, 
        emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
        intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
        bodily health), but not including a statement of 
        memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
        believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
        identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). 
 
In Stelwagon, the plaintiff offered the customers' 
statements to prove, not only causation, i.e., the reason it 
lost business -- for which purpose it would be admissible 
evidence of motive under Rule 803(3) -- but also loss, i.e., 
the fact that it lost business to the defendants. We 
concluded that the customers' statements about why they 
purchased from Standard was inadmissible to prove that 
they actually did so. See 63 F.3d at 1274 ("Statements that 
are considered under the exception to the hearsay rule 
found at Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) . . . cannot be offered to prove 
the truth of the underlying facts asserted." (footnote 
omitted)). As we have explained, " `[s]tatements of a 
customer as to his reasons for not dealing with a supplier 
are admissible for this limited purpose,' i.e., the purpose of 
proving customer motive, but not as evidence of the facts 
recited as furnishing the motives." J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv- 
A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1535 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
297 F.2d 906, 914 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
 
We think that the District Court's dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' evidence on the basis of Stelwagon  was 
inappropriate. The purpose for which the customers' 
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statements are offered in this case differs in substance from 
the purpose for which the court in Stelwagon found them 
inadmissible. In that case, the only evidence of actual loss, 
i.e., that customers stopped purchasing from the plaintiff, 
was the employees' reports that customers had said that 
they were no longer buying from the plaintiff because the 
plaintiff 's competitors had lower prices. We concluded that 
this evidence could not be used to prove such loss. While 
the plaintiffs here have also offered similar testimony that 
their customers told them that they were purchasing beer 
from the Beer World stores and not the plaintiffs, they offer 
it only for "the [limited] purpose of proving customer 
motive," for which purpose we found such evidence 
admissible under Rule 803(3). Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1274.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The defendants also complain that, even if the testimony is otherwise 
admissible under Rule 803(3), it is not admissible, particularly for use 
at 
the summary judgment stage, because the declarants are unidentified or 
inadequately identified. First, the defendants contend that this means 
the evidence cannot meet the plaintiffs' burden to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment because it is not in an admissible form. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e) ("Supporting and opposing affidavits [introduced at the 
summary judgment stage] . . . shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence . . . ."); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1234 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting 
that evidence introduced to defeat a motion for summary judgment must 
be "capable of being admissible at trial"). In particular, the defendants 
argue that, since the declarants are unidentified, there is no way to 
ensure that they will be able or willing to testify at trial. We need not 
consider this issue, however, because the statements are admissible 
hearsay as discussed in the text. 
 
Moreover, contrary to the defendants' apparent suggestion, we do not 
think that the fact that the declarants are not specifically identified is 
relevant for determining whether their statements fall within the Rule 
803(3) hearsay exception. The defendants cite Philbin v. Trans Union 
Corp., 101 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 1996), for the proposition that a hearsay 
statement by an unidentified or unknown person"is not `capable of 
being admissible at trial.' " Philbin, 101 F.3d at 961 n.1 (quoting 
Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1234 n.9). Philbin is distinguishable, however. 
The plaintiff in that case relied on the statement of an unidentified 
official of the defendant as direct evidence of the defendant's allegedly 
unlawful motive in a Fair Credit Reporting Act suit. The declarant's 
identity was important to ensure that he or she was in fact an official of 
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In addition, however, the record contains other non- 
hearsay evidence of a type not before the court in 
Stelwagon, that the plaintiffs offer to prove the fact of loss, 
the issue for which the court in Stelwagon found the 
customers' statements inadmissible. Here, the plaintiffs 
themselves testified that they knew of customers who used 
to purchase beer from them, but no longer did. This is 
direct evidence of an actual loss of customers. Although in 
Stelwagon we held that customers' hearsay statements 
were not admissible to prove lost business, the plaintiffs' 
own testimony about the actual behavior of their customers 
is not hearsay. Rather, it is admissible evidence of lost 
business, although not of the reason therefore. Thus, in the 
present case, the plaintiffs' testimony that certain 
customers no longer purchased beer from them, coupled 
with their testimony concerning the customers' statements 
of their motive, which is admissible hearsay under Rule 
803(3), are together evidence of the fact of damage. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the defendant company whose statement would be admissible 
nonhearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d). Identity was a critical element of 
admissibility. 
 
The customers' statements in this case, however, are different. In a 
practical sense, their identities are not important. The relevance of 
their 
statements depends only on the fact that they were the plaintiffs' 
customers, not their particular identities. Furthermore, we do not think 
that the admissibility of their statements under the Rule 803(3) hearsay 
exception depends on their being identified. Knowing the specific identity 
of the declarant will not make the statements more trustworthy evidence 
of the declarants' descriptions of their states of mind, the primary 
concern in interpreting hearsay exceptions. 
 
In United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1998), we 
held that the identity of the declarant is a substantial, although not 
determinative, factor in determining whether a hearsay statement is 
admissible under the present sense impression or the excited utterance 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The proposed evidence in that case was 
an anonymous note purportedly identifying a getaway car. We held that 
the note was not admissible as a present sense impression or excited 
utterance because there was no evidence that the unidentified declarant 
personally perceived the event or condition about which the statement is 
made. With respect to a state-of-mind statement, however, it is only 
important that the declarant be the person whose state of mind the 
statement concerns, which is true by definition. 
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3. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Causation: The 
next question is whether this evidence is sufficient to defeat 
a motion for summary judgment. "[O]ur jurisprudence does 
not require the summary judgment opponent to match, 
item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the 
movant, but rather he or she must only exceed the`mere 
scintilla' standard." Rossi, 156 F.3d at 466 (citations and 
some quotations omitted). We recently confronted the 
question of the sufficiency of this sort of evidence of 
causation in antitrust cases. In Rossi, the plaintiff offered, 
in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the testimony of several potential customers that 
they would have purchased a certain product from him if 
he had not been deprived of it in violation of the antitrust 
laws. We concluded that this evidence was sufficient 
evidence of fact of damage to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment: 
 
        Rossi has proffered evidence from five specific 
        customers that they would have purchased GAF 
        product from Rossi if he had been able to sell it to 
        them, and Rossi's inability to consummate those sales 
        (leading to a loss of business and therefore injury) is a 
        direct result of the alleged antitrust violation-- the 
        group boycott. In addition, Richard Droesch, Rossi's 
        partner in the failed Rossi Florence venture, backed 
        out of that venture at least in part based upon his 
        understanding that the company would not be able to 
        get the products it needed, particularly GAF product, 
        to compete successfully in the market. For all these 
        reasons, we believe that the record supports Rossi's 
        allegations that he suffered antitrust injury, and that it 
        was caused by the defendant's [sic] allegedly unlawful 
        actions. 
 
156 F.3d at 485. We think that Rossi supports the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs' testimony concerning their 
customers' actions and statements is sufficient to meet 
their burden to produce evidence of loss and causation. 
 
Initially, we reject the defendants' attempt to distinguish 
Rossi on the ground that the customers there stated that 
they would have purchased product from Rossi but for 
circumstances that were the direct and intended result of 
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the conspiracy. As noted previously, we have had to 
assume for the purposes of this appeal that the plaintiffs 
will be able to prove that the defendants violated the 
antitrust laws. The direct result of these violations would be 
the Beer World stores' ability to sell beer at a lower price 
than the plaintiffs, the precise circumstance the customers 
cited as a reason for their actions. 
 
The defendants also submit that Rossi is distinguishable 
because in this case there was no admissible evidence that 
the customers purchased beer from the Beer World stores. 
Of course, the defendants are correct that the testimony at 
issue is not admissible to prove that the customers 
purchased beer from the defendants. See Stelwagon, 63 
F.3d at 1274. But the plaintiffs do not need to prove that 
point; in order to establish antitrust liability and damages, 
all the plaintiffs must show is that they suffered an 
economic loss as a result of the defendants' antitrust 
violations; not that the defendants benefitted from that loss 
directly. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 464-65 (plaintiff, in order to 
recover on an antitrust claim, must prove an antitrust 
violation and "that the plaintiffs were injured as a 
proximate result of that" violation (citation omitted)). As 
long as the plaintiffs can prove that they lost business, and 
that this loss was a result of the defendants' antitrust 
violations, they can bring a successful antitrust claim. 
 
At all events, Rossi makes no mention of any evidence, or 
even any requirement, that the customers in that case 
purchased product from the defendants instead of the 
plaintiff. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 485. For all we know, the 
customers who offered testimony in Rossi simply decided 
not to purchase GAF product at all, instead of buying it 
from the defendants. What the customers did instead of 
purchasing product from the plaintiff is irrelevant, so long 
as there is evidence that they did not purchase from the 
plaintiff because of the defendants' antitrust violations. 
 
In addition to these points, we also find it significant that 
neither here nor in Rossi did the customer evidence purport 
to prove any specific amount of damages. Although the 
plaintiff in Rossi proffered the testimony of five customers, 
these customers gave no indication of exactly how much 
product they would have bought from him if they could. Yet 
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we concluded that the evidence of causation was sufficient. 
This conclusion was driven by the principle that, on review 
of a grant of summary judgment, we should focus on 
whether there is sufficient evidence of fact of damage in 
general, not on the sufficiency of the evidence of a specific 
amount of damages. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 484. 
Accordingly, just as in Rossi, the lack of specific evidence of 
the total amount of lost beer sales does not preclude our 
ultimate conclusion that the customer evidence, especially 
in conjunction with the expert evidence discussed next, is 
sufficient to meet the plaintiffs' burden of producing 
evidence of fact of damage. 
 
B. Expert Evidence 
 
The plaintiffs also offered expert opinion evidence in 
support of their contention that the defendants' alleged 
antitrust violations caused actual injuries to them. In 
particular, they offered the report and testimony of their 
primary expert, Garth Seidel, along with the report and 
testimony of their rebuttal expert, Brian Sullivan, to that 
effect. Neither the defendant nor the District Court raised a 
question about the admissibility of Seidel's or Sullivan's 
opinion, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 
(1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). The District Court concluded, however, that this 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to permit a 
finding of causation. In particular, the Court noted that 
Seidel's opinion appeared to be based primarily on timing, 
and that he did not consider a number of possible 
alternative causes of the plaintiffs' losses. It therefore 
concluded that Seidel's report was deficient under the 
standards we have set forth in previous cases. We disagree. 
 
1. Seidel's Report: Seidel concluded, base d on the facts 
provided to him, that "the plaintiffs experienced significant 
drops in gross profits in the period subsequent to the start 
of Beer World operations and which were caused by the 
Beer World Stores' unique advantage." App. at 830. He 
began by collecting data on gross profits of the sixteen 
plaintiffs from 1980 to 1995, although such information 
was not available from every plaintiff for every year, or even 
for many of the years. He then made two calculations. First, 
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using the admittedly incomplete data he had, he calculated 
the plaintiffs' average annual gross profits for the periods 
from 1980-84 and 1985-95. He then estimated that the 
plaintiffs' damages were the difference between these two 
numbers, multiplied by eleven years and sixteen plaintiffs, 
or approximately $6.6 million. Second, he made a similar 
calculation, but using only data from the six plaintiffs for 
whom data was available for most of the years. This method 
gave a damages estimate of $2 million. 
 
Next, he concluded that these lost profits "were caused 
by the Beer World Stores' unique advantage." App. at 830. 
He based this opinion initially on his conclusion that the 
Beer Worlds' ability to purchase beer at a lower wholesale 
cost "must have had a significant impact on the market." 
App. at 831. He also stated that the Beer World stores' 
aggressive price advertising would have magnified the effect 
of the special discount. In addition, he examined Fuhrer's 
profits between 1989 and 1994, and observed that they 
increased substantially during this period. Based on this, 
Seidel concluded that the malt-beverage market 
experienced no downturn during this time. Third, he noted 
that, beginning in 1991 -- after the grand jury investigation 
of Trone began -- the Beer World stores' volume of business 
declined each year until 1995, while at the same time the 
plaintiffs' gross profits increased. Finally, he noted that two 
other stores had opened using a "supermarket" approach 
similar to the Beer Worlds'. One of them opened shortly 
after the Beer World stores, but failed within a matter of 
months in spite of aggressive promotions. The other was 
open from the mid-1970's to the mid-1990's, but did not 
appear to have had any effect on the plaintiffs. App. at 829- 
32. 
 
The District Court found Seidel's report inadequate to 
meet the plaintiffs' burden of production because it failed to 
consider other market forces that could have explained the 
plaintiffs' losses. The Court began with the proposition that 
"any analysis of antitrust, RICO or similar damage that fails 
to exclude or take account of any adverse effects caused by 
other factors, including lawful competition on the part of 
the defendants, is fatally flawed." Dist. Ct. Op. IV, at 6. It 
observed that Seidel's report did not include a comparison 
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of costs and business practices, price advertising, the 
availability of pool-buying and other discounts, store size, 
purchasing capacity, or proximity to a Beer World store, 
any one of which might have provided an alternative 
explanation for the plaintiffs' losses. Furthermore, it noted 
that Seidel had specifically failed to consider whether any 
other differences between the plaintiffs and the Beer World 
stores accounted for the plaintiffs' loss of business to the 
latter. Given these omissions, the District Court concluded 
that Seidel's report provided insufficient evidence of 
causation. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that we must reverse the judgment 
because the District Court relied, in its legal analysis, on 
the district court's opinion in Rossi rejecting Rossi's 
proffered expert evidence, which opinion we later reversed 
on these exact grounds, although not until well after the 
District Court in the present case had issued its opinions. 
See Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 976 
(D.N.J. 1997), revd., 156 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 1998). As this 
question is before us on an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment and our review is plenary, we will start 
from the premise that it is the defendants's burden to show 
that Seidel's report is inadequate to create a genuine issue 
of material fact as to causation. We begin with a review of 
our case law in this area, and then apply that law to the 
evidence before us. 
 
2. Precedent: Stelwagon and Rossi:  We have twice 
recently considered the sufficiency of expert evidence 
offered as proof of causation in antitrust cases. See Rossi, 
156 F.3d at 485-87; Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275-76. In 
addition to the customer evidence discussed above, the 
plaintiff in Stelwagon offered expert opinion evidence to 
prove causation. In brief, "based on the assumption that 
but for Tarmac's price discrimination, Stelwagon's sales of 
MAPs would have tracked its sales of [other] products [not 
subject to anticompetitive practices], Dr. Perry concluded 
that Stelwagon lost $257,000 in profits as a result of 
Tarmac's illegal pricing policy." Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. More specifically, the expert's report based its analysis on two 
premises. First, it assumed that Stelwagon's sales of the product at issue 
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We concluded that the expert's testimony, although 
admissible evidence, was insufficient by itself to prove that 
the antitrust violations had in fact caused Stelwagon's 
losses: 
 
         Significantly, Dr. Perry's analysis failed to sufficiently 
        link any decline in Stelwagon's MAPs sales to price 
        discrimination. The sales may have been lost for 
        reasons apart from the price discrimination -- reasons 
        that Dr. Perry's analysis apparently did not take into 
        account. For example, the evidence showed that 
        Stelwagon had higher overhead costs than his 
        competitors. In addition, there was undisputed 
        evidence that Stelwagon experienced other business 
        complications during the relevant time period. In 1988, 
        for example, Stelwagon terminated a vice-president, 
        two territorial managers and three key employees for 
        their part in an embezzlement scheme. 
 
Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275. Given that Stelwagon had not 
offered any other evidence of loss -- as discussed 
previously, its employees' anecdotal testimony concerning 
lost customers was not admissible to prove that it actually 
lost customers, see Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1274-75 -- we 
concluded that he could not meet his burden of proof, 
Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275-76. 
 
In Rossi, by contrast, we considered an expert opinion 
and found it sufficient to prove loss and causation. The 
expert in Rossi rested his calculation of damages on two 
assumptions: 
 
        First, he estimated that Rossi[`s businesses] would 
        have achieved the same pattern of sales revenues (and 
        revenue growth) beginning in 1989 and extending to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
during the year in which it did not allegedly suffer antitrust harm were 
representative of what the sales would have been in the absence of such 
harm. Second, the expert assumed that its sales of this product would 
follow a pattern similar to that of other products Stelwagon sold. 
Finally, 
the expert posited that Stelwagon would have been able to charge the 
same retail markup on the product at issue as it did on other products. 
Based on these assumptions, the expert calculated Stelwagon's lost sales 
and profits. See Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275. 
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        2008 that ABC's Morristown sales branch actually 
        achieved from 1990-93, operating out of the same 
        location, with Rossi as branch manager. . . . The 
        second major assumption in the Rockhill Report is that 
        Rossi would have been able to manage [his proposed 
        businesses] in the manner that he had run Standard's 
        Morristown branch from 1984-87. Rockhill used 
        Standard's Morristown branch financial statements to 
        develop 14-year averages for [costs] and applied them 
        to the sales estimate. 
 
Rossi, 156 F.3d at 486 (footnote omitted). Based on these 
assumptions, the expert estimated Rossi's losses as a result 
of the defendants' antitrust violations. 
 
We determined that this expert evidence was sufficient 
proof of causation to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. We began our analysis with the recognition that 
the expert's opinion was a "but for" damage model -- one 
that "aggregates the defendant's alleged violations and 
creates a hypothetical calculation projecting the plaintiff 's 
profits and losses `but for' the defendant's antitrust 
violations" -- which several courts have rejected. Rossi, 156 
F.3d at 485 (citing Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1982), affd., 740 F.2d 
980 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1268 (D.N.J. 1979), affd., 631 F.2d 251 
(3d Cir. 1980)). We identified two key problems with the use 
of "but for" damage models: 
 
         First, they do not attempt to measure the 
        particularized effects of any specific alleged illegal 
        activities, but rather rely on an aggregation of injury 
        from all factors. Second, their hypothetical "but for" 
        calculations usually rely upon unrealistic ex ante 
        assumptions about the business environment, such as 
        assumptions of perfect knowledge of future demand, 
        future prices, and future costs that tend to overstate 
        the plaintiff 's damages claim. Thus, using a"but for" 
        damage model arguably makes it impossible for the 
        trier of fact to determine what, if any, injury derived 
        from the defendant's antitrust violations as opposed to 
        other factors, and courts sometimes reject such models 
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        as the basis of either causation or the amount of 
        injury. 
 
Rossi, 156 F.3d at 486 (citations omitted). 
 
We concluded that, although the Rockhill Report rested 
on a "but for" damage model, this did not mean it was 
inadequate proof of causation, because it did not have the 
usual problems of "but for" damage models. We noted that, 
since the Report was based on the actual performance of 
other businesses -- the business Rossi managed instead of 
running his own and the business he formerly managed-- 
it did not involve any "unrealistic ex ante assumptions 
about the business environment." We concluded that, "This 
kind of estimate, while perhaps not one upon which we 
would base our own personal investment decisions, 
nevertheless is sufficient to establish causation . . . ." Rossi, 
156 F.3d at 485. 
 
We also rejected the defendants' argument, upon which 
the district court had rested its decision, see Rossi, 958 F. 
Supp. at 991, that the Rockhill Report was inadequate 
because it failed to consider possible alternative causes of 
Rossi's losses. In particular, the defendants contended that 
Rossi's businesses failed because: "(1) they were start-up 
operations, (2) they were founded during one of the worst 
recessions ever to hit the New Jersey housing market, (3) 
Rossi, as a manager, failed to control his costs, and/or (4) 
Rossi worked on other ventures to the detriment and 
ultimate failure of both companies." Rossi , 156 F.3d at 486. 
Although we recognized that these explanations might 
ultimately prove to be correct, we found that they were 
issues of fact best left to the jury, not reasons for 
concluding that the Rockhill Report was insufficient 
evidence of causation as a matter of law. 
 
3. Application to Seidel's Report: We beli eve that our 
jurisprudence supports the conclusion that the plaintiffs, 
by offering Seidel's report, have produced sufficient 
evidence of causation to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. Here, as in Rossi, Seidel's report rests on 
assumptions that are based on past performance, not 
guesses as to the future. His opinion was based on the 
assumption that the plaintiffs' performance in the years 
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before Beer World entered the Pittsburgh market provided 
an appropriate benchmark for their performance thereafter. 
This assumption does not rest on any "assumptions of 
perfect knowledge of future demand, future prices, and 
future costs" of the sort we condemned in Rossi. At most, 
it requires some consideration of whether general economic 
conditions were substantially similar before and after the 
Beer World stores opened. Seidel's observation that 
Fuhrer's sales increased substantially during the period 
after the Beer World stores opened strongly suggests that 
economic conditions were at least as good during this 
period. See App. at 831. 
 
The defendants, in response, identify several problems 
that they believe render Seidel's report inadequate. In 
general, the defendants criticize Seidel's report for failing to 
take into account potential alternative causes for the 
plaintiffs' losses not attributable to the defendants' actions.13 
Seidel stated that, "In my opinion, it does not appear that 
the losses in plaintiffs' profits . . . were caused by market 
factors other than plaintiffs' competition with the Beer 
World stores in the face of the availability to the Beer 
Worlds of unique discounts and special services, such as 
free delivery." App. at 831. The defendants contend that, 
just as we found in Stelwagon that the expert's report was 
inadequate because it failed to consider alternative causes, 
so must we find Seidel's report inadequate because he 
failed to consider certain specific factors that might have 
affected the plaintiffs' business success, such as general 
economic conditions, changes in their operations during the 
relevant time period, or changes in costs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The defendants also contend that, even if Seidel has shown that the 
defendants' acts caused the damages, he has not shown that the 
defendants' illegal acts caused damages. The defendants are correct that 
Seidel failed to account for many variations in what the defendants did 
during the periods that Seidel aggregated for analysis. We cannot 
evaluate this contention without a clearer picture of the scope of the 
defendants' antitrust violations, however. In the absence of such a 
clarification, we will leave it to the District Court to consider this 
objection in the first instance after examining the plaintiffs' antitrust 
liability theories in greater depth. Only after such a closer examination 
can this criticism of Seidel's report be given adequate consideration. 
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Initially, we note that, as discussed above, Seidel does 
discuss some of these factors the defendants suggest he 
should have -- including general economic conditions -- 
albeit not to the degree the defendants might prefer. In 
addition, he specifically noted a correlation between 
declining profits for the Beer World stores and increasing 
profits for the plaintiffs after the criminal indictment came 
down in 1991. Furthermore, we think that the factors 
Seidel failed to explain are more like those at issue in Rossi, 
in which we found the export's report acceptable in spite of 
certain gaps, than the factors in Stelwagon. In the latter 
case, the expert failed to discuss certain factors-- higher 
overhead costs and embezzlement by the plaintiff 's 
employees -- about which the defendants introduced 
specific evidence. In Rossi, by contrast, the defendants 
argued that the Rockhill Report was inadequate because of 
factors the effects of which were pure speculation on the 
defendants' part. Similarly, the defendants here propose 
numerous factors extrinsic to the defendants that might 
explain the plaintiffs' losses. But they have not directed us 
to any point in the record that suggest that these concerns 
were actually relevant in this case. Accordingly, we will 
leave these questions to be resolved during further 
proceedings in the District Court. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 
487 ("[Although o]ne or more of these reasons. . . might 
explain Rossi's failure and could conceivably result in a 
verdict for the defendants at trial . . . they all involve 
factual disputes that need to be resolved by the trier of fact, 
not by this court on a motion for summary judgment."). 
 
Finally, the defendants make a number of arguments to 
the effect that Seidel's method of calculating the plaintiffs' 
losses is unsupported and inappropriate. Seidel's 
calculations were based on the average or aggregate gross 
profits of the plaintiffs. The defendants contend that this 
use of averages was inappropriate, as it ignored potential 
differences among the plaintiffs. For instance, it ignores the 
problem that data was not available for all of the plaintiffs 
for all of the relevant time period. Furthermore, there is no 
way to determine based on this calculation how the 
damages are to be allocated among the plaintiffs. Finally, it 
masks the fact that some of the plaintiffs in fact had higher 
gross profits during the relevant period as compared with 
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earlier. The defendants' observations are, of course, correct. 
They ignore a vital distinction, however: proof of fact of 
damage and proof of the actual amount of damages are two 
distinct steps. Cf. Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1276 n.19 
("Because of our conclusion on the issue of Stelwagon's 
entitlement to damages under the Clayton Act [i.e., he 
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove causation], we 
do not reach Tarmac's argument that the amount of 
damages is unsupported by the evidence."). 
 
As we stated in Rossi, at the summary judgment stage 
"we are not, as we would be upon reviewing a jury verdict, 
determining whether a plaintiff has brought forth sufficient 
evidence to justify the actual damages awarded." Rossi, 156 
F.3d at 484. Rather, before us is only the question whether 
the defendants' unlawful actions caused the plaintiffs' 
losses. See 156 F.3d at 484. Although in Rossi we did 
specifically note that the Rockhill Report would support a 
damages judgment in the amount the expert estimated, we 
did so only for the future guidance of the district court, and 
not for any purposes related to deciding motions for 
summary judgment. See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 486 n.22 ("For 
the guidance of the district court on remand, we note that 
the Rockhill Report satisfies the relaxed Bigelow standard 
of proof for estimating the amount of damages . . . ." 
(emphasis added)). 
 
In sum, we believe that, although the question is close, 
Seidel's report, like the Rockhill Report in Rossi, is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning fact of damage. This is in contrast to the expert 
evidence offered in Stelwagon, in which the expert's opinion 
involved more speculation and failed to explain certain 
factors concerning which the defendants had presented 
specific evidence at trial. 
 
4. Sullivan's Report: We find additional  evidence of loss 
and causation, contributing to our ultimate conclusion that 
the plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence of fact of 
damage, in the report of the plaintiffs' rebuttal expert, 
Brian Sullivan. Sullivan examined the defendants' expert's 
report and rebutted it in part. Although his report focused 
primarily on antitrust liability issues, Sullivan observed 
that, between 1985 and 1993, beer distributors in 
 
                                37 
  
Allegheny County failed at a rate nearly twice that in 
Pennsylvania as a whole. The plaintiffs argue that, since 
the record suggests no other distinction between Allegheny 
County and the remainder of the Commonwealth than the 
presence of Beer World stores, the logical conclusion is that 
these failures were caused by the Beer World stores. 
 
The defendants contend that we cannot consider 
Sullivan's report for several reasons. First, they submit that 
we cannot do so because he functioned only as the 
plaintiffs' rebuttal expert to respond to the defendants' 
expert, and that his report and testimony therefore cannot 
be introduced to support the plaintiffs' substantive case. 
The District Court refused to consider Sullivan's report on 
precisely these grounds. We think that that refusal was 
inappropriate. See Bowers v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 905 F. 
Supp. 1004, 1008 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that labeling of 
a witness as a rebuttal expert did not preclude 
consideration of his testimony to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Rule 26(a)(2) governing the disclosure and discovery of 
expert witnesses in particular, make no distinction between 
the permissible uses of "regular" experts and"rebuttal" 
experts. Furthermore, we see no reason to prevent the 
plaintiffs from using Sullivan in their case-in-chief at trial. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider Sullivan's report 
as evidence in opposition to the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
Second, the defendants submit that the distinction upon 
which the plaintiffs base their reasoning is flawed, in that 
Sullivan's own report reveals that there were Beer World 
stores in other parts of Pennsylvania. Although there may 
have been other beer supermarkets in Pennsylvania, as far 
as we can determine from the record the only other Beer 
World store was one in Harrisburg. We do not think the 
existence of this one store can be sufficient to render 
Sullivan's opinion a nullity as a matter of law. 
 
Third and last, the defendants argue that Sullivan's 
report is irrelevant, since it focuses on predatory pricing 
and the Beer World operations in general, rather than the 
specific discriminatory discount. Once again, we note that 
the record before us is not sufficiently developed for us to 
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address this contention. We will assume for present 
purposes that the Beer World stores committed antitrust 
violations. Accordingly, we leave the defendants' contention 
to the District Court to consider in the first instance. We 
conclude that Sullivan's report provides some additional 
evidence of causation that, together with Seidel's report, 
meets the plaintiffs' burden of production on the issue of 
actual loss and causation in fact. 
 
C. Is the Evidence in the Aggregate Sufficient to 
        Prove Causation in Fact? 
 
At all events, we are satisfied that Seidel's report, as well 
as Sullivan's, in conjunction with the customer evidence 
discussed above, constitutes sufficient evidence of 
causation. In Stelwagon, we noted that there was no 
admissible evidence that the plaintiffs had suffered injuries 
attributable to the defendants' price discrimination. See 
Stelwagon, 63 F.3d at 1275. We therefore held that the 
expert's report was not sufficient evidence of causation and 
loss. Here, by contrast, there is direct evidence-- i.e., the 
plaintiffs' testimony about their customers' behavior -- that 
identifies customers whom the plaintiffs lost as a result of 
the defendants' actions. See supra section III.A. 
Furthermore, there is evidence -- the customers' hearsay 
statements, which are admissible under Rule 803(3), in 
addition to the expert reports -- of the reasons for such 
loss. Thus, the plaintiffs have "adduced evidence of specific 
lost transactions showing causation or fact of injury, which 
is bolstered by an expert damage report that is not overly 
speculative as a matter of law." Rossi, 156 F.3d at 487. We 
conclude that all of this evidence taken together defeats the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that the plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence of 
fact of damage on their antitrust claims.14 Accordingly, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The defendants offer as an alternative ground for affirming the 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' antitrust claim that the plaintiffs have 
failed 
to show that they suffered an "antitrust injury." Since we have declined 
to consider whether the plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence of 
antitrust violations at the present time, we will also refrain from 
considering the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs cannot prove 
an antitrust injury. See supra Part II. 
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will reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
on the antitrust claims, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
IV. RICO: Proximate Causation 
 
A. Basic Principles 
 
In addition to establishing that the defendants' unlawful 
actions in fact caused the plaintiffs' losses, the plaintiffs 
must also establish proximate causation, i.e., that this 
causal connection is not too remote. Although this 
requirement applies to both antitrust and RICO claims, in 
this section we focus on the latter, because the plaintiffs' 
RICO claim founders on these grounds. A causal 
connection simpliciter between the defendants' actions and 
the plaintiffs' injuries is insufficient to give rise to a RICO 
claim; the plaintiff must show that that connection is 
proximate, i.e., not too remote. See Holmes v. Securities 
Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992); 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The defendants contend that, with respect to the 
plaintiffs' RICO claim, the causal connection between the 
defendants' racketeering activities -- defrauding the LCB -- 
is too remote as a matter of law from the plaintiffs' losses 
-- lost business. We agree. The LCB and the 
Commonwealth more generally were the direct victims of 
the defendants' actions; the plaintiffs' losses are at most 
derivative of any injuries to the LCB's regulatory mission. 
The plaintiffs are simply to remote to be able to bring a 
claim based on the defendants' actions. 
 
In Holmes, the Court identified three key factors in 
determining whether a RICO claim is based on an injury 
too remote from the alleged racketeering activity: 
 
        First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it 
        becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff 's 
        damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from 
        other, independent, factors. Second, quite apart from 
        problems of proving factual causation, recognizing 
        claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to 
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        adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among 
        plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the 
        violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. 
        And, finally, the need to grapple with these problems is 
        simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring 
        injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can 
        generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private 
        attorneys general, without any of the problems 
        attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more 
        remotely. 
 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 (citing, inter alia, Associated 
General Contractors, Inc. v. California St. Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540-42 (1983));15 see also 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 932 (citing Holmes). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although the Court in Holmes adopted these three factors for RICO 
cases from Associated General Contractors, we recognized in Steamfitters 
that the Court in the latter case had outlined six factors relevant to 
antitrust proximate causation analysis. See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 
924. These factors included: 
 
        (1) the causal connection between defendant's wrongdoing and 
        plaintiff 's harm; (2) the specific intent of defendant to harm 
plaintiff; 
        (3) the nature of plaintiff 's alleged injury (and whether it 
relates to 
        the purpose of antitrust laws, i.e., ensuring competition within 
        economic markets); (4) "the directness or indirectness of the 
        asserted injury"; (5) whether the "damages claim is . . . highly 
        speculative"; and (6) "keeping the scope of complex antitrust 
trials 
        within judicially manageable limits," i.e., "avoiding either the 
risk of 
        duplicate recoveries on the one hand, or the danger of complex 
        apportionment of damages on the other." 
 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 924 (quoting Associated General Contractors, 
459 U.S. at 537-38, 540, 542-44). In our discussion of proximate 
causation for the RICO claims in Steamfitters , in addition to analyzing 
the Holmes factors, we incorporated by reference our discussion of the 
Associated General Contractors factors from the antitrust analysis. We 
did not express an opinion as to whether the Holmes factors replace the 
Associated General Contractors factors for RICO claims or merely 
supplement them. 
 
At all events, to the extent the Associated General Contractors factors 
are relevant only to antitrust analysis, they are irrelevant in the 
present 
case. In addition, to the extent that any of the issues raised in these 
factors are not included in Holmes, they only weigh against a finding of 
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Both Holmes and Steamfitters clarified how the three 
factors set forth above would apply in particular cases.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
proximate causation. For example, the second factor, specific intent to 
injure, is arguably not included in Holmes. To the extent it is not, 
however, we think it would be difficult on the present facts to conclude 
that the defendants specifically intended to harm the plaintiffs. Although 
harm to the plaintiffs may have been a probable ultimate consequence 
of the defendants' actions, we do not think they specifically intended to 
cause such harm. Accordingly, considering this factor in addition to the 
Holmes analysis would only provide an additional reason to conclude 
that proximate causation is lacking. 
 
16. In a recent case, we concluded that RICO proximate causation 
existed without specifically analyzing the Holmes factors. See Brokerage 
Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998). That 
case is distinguishable, however. The plaintiff BCI had formerly been the 
administrator of a pharmacy's self-funded employee health-insurance 
plan. When the pharmacy opened a new branch that it wanted to be a 
part of U.S. Healthcare's network, U.S. Healthcare essentially forced the 
pharmacy to use a U.S. Healthcare affiliate as its health-plan 
administrator, rather than the plaintiff. We concluded that, in such 
circumstances, proximate causation could exist: 
 
        The injury proved by BCI, the loss of its TPA contract with Gary's 
        [the pharmacy], is not derivative of any losses suffered by 
Gary's. 
        Unlike the injuries suffered by the non-purchasing customers in 
        Holmes, BCI's injury was not contingent upon any injury to Gary's, 
        nor is it more appropriately attributable to an intervening cause 
that 
        was not a predicate act under RICO. Here, BCI's[administrator] 
        relationship with Gary's was the direct target of the alleged 
scheme 
        -- indeed, interference with that relationship may well be deemed 
        the linchpin of the scheme's success. 
 
Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 521. The plaintiffs contend, similarly, 
that interference with their relationship with their customers, i.e., 
attracting the plaintiffs' customers to shop at Beer World stores, the 
precise harm the plaintiffs suffered, is the "linchpin of [Trone's] 
scheme's 
success." Although it may be true that interference in the relationship 
between the plaintiffs and their customers was the linchpin of the 
success of Trone's scheme, we think Brokerage Concepts is 
distinguishable. 
 
The relationship between the alleged racketeering activities and the 
injuries to the plaintiffs are more distant than they were in Brokerage 
Concepts. In the latter case, the pharmacy, the party with whom BCI had 
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The factual circumstances of these two cases, which inform 
our decision, are briefly summarized in the margin.17 
 
B. Anatomy of the Plaintiffs' RICO Claim 
 
The plaintiffs' RICO claim alleges that the defendants 
engaged in racketeering activities by fraudulently obtaining 
and retaining licenses to operate beer distributorships. 
Specifically, they contend that Trone and others made false 
and fraudulent statements to the Pennsylvania LCB in 
order to obtain or retain various liquor licenses. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a relationship with which U.S. Healthcare interfered, was the direct 
target of U.S. Healthcare's alleged racketeering activities, which 
included 
extortion and commercial bribery. See Brokerage Concepts, 140 F.3d at 
521. Here, although the ultimate goal of Trone and the Beer World stores 
was presumably to woo customers away from the plaintiffs, the direct 
target of its alleged fraudulent scheme was the LCB, not customers. 
Unlike Brokerage Concepts, this case involves two third parties, one that 
was the target of the defendants' racketeering and another that had a 
relationship with the plaintiffs with which the defendants interfered. 
 
17. In Holmes, the plaintiffs (actually the plaintiffs' subrogors, 
although 
that was not relevant to the result) were customers of broker-dealers 
that had failed as a result of the defendants' conspiracy to manipulate 
certain stocks. As a result of the broker-dealers' failure, their 
customers 
suffered losses. The particular plaintiffs in Holmes were customers of the 
broker-dealers who never purchased the particular stocks that the 
defendants had manipulated. Thus, the plaintiffs' losses were not an 
immediate result of the defendants' manipulations, but rather were a 
derivative effect of the collapse of the broker-dealers. The Court found 
this connection insufficient to establish proximate causation for RICO 
claims. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271. 
 
Steamfitters involved claims of union health and welfare funds against 
tobacco companies. The funds alleged that the tobacco companies had 
defrauded the funds by misleading them into believing that tobacco 
products were safe and could not be made safer. As a result of this 
fraud, the funds did not take steps to reduce their costs by, for example, 
attempting to reduce smoking among their participants or undertaking 
legal efforts to shift the costs of smoking back to the companies. The 
funds were harmed because their participants continued to smoke and 
accumulate medical bills that the funds were obligated to pay. We 
concluded that this causal chain was too attenuated to satisfy the 
requirements of proximate causation. See 171 F.3d at 932-34. 
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plaintiffs themselves best summarize their contention that 
the defendants' actions proximately caused their injuries: 
 
        [C]ausation in plaintiffs' RICO case . . . is a simple 
        claim: we say that absent the fraud, the Trone 
        defendants would not have been able to assemble or 
        operate the chain of stores, and that only by 
        assembling the chain -- by "aggregat[ing]" their 
        purchases, as Mr. Fuhrer put it -- were the Beer 
        Worlds able to secure the discriminatory discount. The 
        Trone defendants' brief (at 40) asks rhetorically how 
        David Trone's fraudulent statements to the LCB caused 
        the discount, but the above two sentences show exactly 
        how: absent the fraud, no chain; absent the chain, no 
        discrimination. It's that simple. 
 
Appellant's Reply Brf. at 13 (emphasis added; alterations in 
original). Although this is a clever and well-phrased 
summary, we disagree with its conclusion because the 
claim does not satisfy the specific factors the Court in 
Holmes identified as indicative of proximate causation.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The plaintiffs argue that, since the defendants' antitrust violations 
were a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' losses, a point the defendants 
do not -- unlike the issue of causation in fact-- presently contest, the 
RICO violations must also be a proximate cause of their losses. They 
base this contention on our recognition in Steamfitters that proximate 
causation principles for antitrust and RICO claims are closely related. 
See Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 921 ("[T]he standing requirements for RICO 
and antitrust claims are similar, and . . . the standing analysis under 
these federal laws is drawn from common-law principles of proximate 
cause and remoteness of injury . . . ."). 
 
The plaintiffs misread Steamfitters. Admittedly, we said in that case 
that "much (if not all) of what we have said above in our discussion of 
antitrust standing applies to the Funds' RICO claims." See 171 F.3d at 
932. But that was simply a recognition that the factual underpinnings of 
the causation chains in the funds' antitrust and RICO claims was so 
similar. The plaintiffs' theory of antitrust proximate causation in this 
case, however, is factually distinct from their RICO theory. Causation in 
their antitrust claim rests on the simple notion that the defendants 
contracted, combined and conspired to force the wholesalers to offer 
them beer at a lower price, which gave them a competitive advantage 
over the plaintiffs. Their RICO claim, however, rests on the more 
complicated theory of causation discussed in the text. It includes the 
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Reflection on these three factors reveals that the direct 
impact of the fraud is primarily on the LCB, not the 
plaintiffs. 
 
C. Analysis 
 
1. Directness of the Injury: The first f actor, and the one 
on which we focused primarily in Steamfitters , is the 
directness of the relationship between the defendants' 
actions and the plaintiffs' injuries. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269. This is significant because "the less direct an injury is, 
the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a 
plaintiff 's damages attributable to the violation as distinct 
from other, independent, factors." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269. 
The more difficult it is to distinguish between the effects of 
the defendants' legitimate activities and their alleged 
racketeering actions on the plaintiffs, the more likely we are 
to conclude that proximate causation is lacking. 
 
In Holmes, the Court found this factor indicated a lack of 
proximate causation. "If the nonpurchasing customers were 
allowed to sue, the district court would first need to 
determine the extent to which their inability to collect from 
the broker-dealers was the result of the alleged conspiracy 
to manipulate, as opposed to, say, the broker-dealers' poor 
business practices or their failures to anticipate 
developments in the financial markets." Holmes, 503 U.S. 
at 272-73. In Steamfitters, we reasoned that 
 
        if the Funds are allowed to sue, the court would need 
        to determine the extent to which their increased costs 
        for smoking-related illnesses resulted from the tobacco 
        companies' conspiracy to suppress health and safety 
        information, as opposed to smokers' other health 
        problems, smokers' independent (i.e., separate from the 
        fraud and the conspiracy) decisions to smoke, smokers' 
        ignoring health and safety warnings, etc. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
additional step that Trone was able to operate the Beer World stores as 
a group because of his fraud on the LCB, which enabled him to obtain 
discounts which hurt the plaintiffs. This additional step distinguishes 
the plaintiffs' RICO and antitrust claims, and bars the inference of 
proximate causation they suggest, for reasons amplified in the text, 
infra. 
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Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 933 (footnote omitted). 
 
We believe that this case presents similar difficulties in 
ascertaining the proportion of the plaintiffs' losses that can 
be attributed to the defendants' alleged racketeering 
activity. We think it would be difficult to trace the chain 
from the fraud on the LCB to particular actions of the 
defendants, and then to particular portions of the plaintiffs' 
losses, because the fraud only directly affects the LCB. In 
order to determine how the fraud affected the plaintiffs, we 
would need to analyze the extent to which the defendants 
were permitted to act as they did as a result of the fraud as 
opposed to normal operating procedures. More specifically, 
focusing solely on the issue of volume discounts, even if we 
could say that the plaintiffs' losses were entirely 
attributable to the defendants' ability to obtain such 
discounts, we would be hard-pressed to say that those 
discounts were entirely attributable to Trone's fraud on a 
third party, the LCB. Rather, it is likely that the defendants' 
ability to obtain these discounts was attributable, in at 
least as substantial a part, to the size of the individual Beer 
World stores, Trone's negotiating ability, the operating 
methodology of the stores, or other legitimate actions. 
Accordingly, we conclude that, "As in Holmes  [and 
Steamfitters], this causation chain is much too speculative 
and attenuated to support a RICO claim." Steamfitters, 171 
F.3d at 933. 
 
2. Apportionment of Damages: Holmes also directs that 
we inquire into the difficulty of apportioning damages 
among potential plaintiffs in determining whether 
proximate causation is present. "[R]ecognizing claims of the 
indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated 
rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at 
different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate 
the risk of multiple recoveries." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269. As 
a result, where granting plaintiffs relief would require us to 
apportion that relief among numerous plaintiffs of different 
standing, we are inclined to find an absence of proximate 
causation for those less directly involved. 
 
Again, this factor as applied to the facts in Holmes 
suggested that proximate causation was missing. The Court 
noted that the broker-dealers had suffered at least as much 
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at the hands of the defendants as their customers did, and 
thus any determination of liability to the customers would 
necessitate an inquiry into the defendants' liability to the 
broker-dealers. The Court concluded that the possibility of 
treble damages in favor of both groups of plaintiffs militated 
in favor of finding no proximate causation for the former. 
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 273 ("[T]he district court would . . . 
have to find some way to apportion the possible respective 
recoveries by the broker-dealers and the customers, who 
would otherwise each be entitled to recover the full treble 
damages."). Likewise, in Steamfitters, we noted the potential 
difficulty in allocating recovery between the funds and their 
participants: 
 
        As we noted in our discussion of the Funds' antitrust 
        claims, more directly injured parties, i.e., smokers, 
        would be unlikely to bring federal claims against 
        tobacco companies for the same damages claimed by 
        the Funds. Yet, as we also noted above, Fund 
        participants who have not been fully reimbursed for 
        their out-of-pocket costs that are traceable to 
        defendants' alleged fraud and conspiracy might bring 
        RICO or antitrust claims. Therefore, as in Holmes, a 
        court adjudicating the Funds' RICO claims would need 
        to consider the appropriate apportionment of damages 
        between smokers and others such as the Funds who 
        suffered economic losses as a result of the tobacco 
        companies' alleged fraudulent acts. 
 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 933. 
 
We believe that these cases support the conclusion that 
the defendants' fraud on the LCB did not proximately cause 
the plaintiffs' injuries. In particular, we note that the 
master distributors from whom the defendants purchased 
their beer at an artificially lowered price -- at least 
according to the plaintiffs' theory of the case-- suffered an 
injury identical to the plaintiffs'. The wholesalers 
presumably were paying the same price to brewers for beer, 
regardless of the price at which they sold it to distributors. 
Any discounts they gave to the Beer World stores as a 
result of racketeering violations came out of their own 
pockets. Determining how to apportion damages between 
the wholesalers and the plaintiffs in this case would require 
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exactly the same sort of apportionment determination 
condemned in Holmes and Steamfitters.19 This difficulty in 
apportioning damages among the potential plaintiffs 
suggests that proximate causation is not present in this 
case. 
 
3. Vindication of Claims by Others: Thefinal factor that 
the Court in Holmes recognized as significant for proximate 
causation analysis was whether the plaintiff 's claim could 
be vindicated by another, more directly injured plaintiff. 
More specifically, the Court recognized that the searching 
inquiry into causation and apportionment of damages 
among plaintiffs discussed above is unjustified where the 
central focus of RICO in deterring unlawful conduct can be 
vindicated by other means. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 
("[T]he need to grapple with these problems is simply 
unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious 
conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be 
counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys 
general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits 
by plaintiffs injured more remotely."). Where a more directly 
affected party is available to vindicate the public interest in 
enforcing the law, we have less need to stretch the limits of 
proximate causation in RICO cases. 
 
In Holmes, the Court concluded that, since the broker- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The plaintiffs in their supplemental memorandum discussing 
Steamfitters contend that we cannot consider the wholesalers in our 
Holmes calculus because "they have decided to make their separate 
peace with Beer World, no doubt for the same reasons they decided to 
acquiesce in this scheme in the first place." Appellant's Post-Arg. Memo. 
at 13. While it may be true that the wholesalers in this case have not 
attempted to recover from the defendants, we do not think this is 
relevant to our Holmes analysis. We do not think the question whether 
the defendants' fraud proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries can turn 
on whether some other potential claimants have filed suit. Although the 
broker-dealers identified in Holmes as having a potential claim did in 
fact sue the defendants in that case, see Holmes , 503 U.S. at 273 & 
n.21, we recognized in Steamfitters that the fact that smokers themselves 
could bring claims against the tobacco companies was relevant to 
determining proximate causation with respect to the funds, even though 
the smokers were in fact unlikely to bring claims on their own, see 
Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 933. 
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dealers were available to vindicate the public interest in 
deterring racketeering, it was unnecessary to extend 
proximate causation analysis to include the customers. 
"[T]he law would be shouldering these difficulties [of making 
fine distinctions among causes of the plaintiff 's injuries 
and apportioning recovery among potential plaintiffs] 
despite the fact that those directly injured, the broker- 
dealers, could be counted on to bring suit for the law's 
vindication." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 273. In Steamfitters, 
however, we found this factor to be less helpful. We noted 
initially that, although the funds' participants might be able 
to pursue RICO claims against the tobacco companies, 
granting due deference to the funds' allegations we could 
not conclude that their suits would provide the same 
deterrence as the funds. We were, however, ultimately 
"unconvinced that this distinction [from Holmes was] 
sufficient to overcome the concerns about apportioning 
damages and, most fundamentally, the remoteness of the 
Funds' alleged RICO injuries from any wrongdoing on the 
part of the tobacco companies." Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 
933-34 (citation omitted). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that this factor dictates afinding 
that proximate causation is present in this case because 
there is no other party that was more directly injured or 
that will otherwise be able to vindicate the public interest 
in deterring racketeering activity of the sort in which the 
defendants have engaged. Preliminarily, as noted above, the 
master distributors were injured by the defendants' 
activities, and accordingly they could presumably serve at 
least as well to vindicate the public interest in deterring 
violations of the law. More significantly, the LCB-- the 
direct victim of the defendants' alleged fraud -- is an 
additional possible alternative agent for vindicating the 
public interest. 
 
As the plaintiffs point out, the LCB would not be able to 
bring a private civil RICO action, since it is not a"person 
injured in his business or property by reason of " the 
defendants' alleged racketeering violations. 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964(c). In spite of the fact that the LCB cannot bring a 
private civil RICO action, we think that the LCB and the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania more generally are in a 
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position to vindicate the public interest in the sense set 
forth in Holmes. If the facts justified it, the Commonwealth 
could bring a criminal charge against Trone and the other 
defendants under the state "little RICO" corrupt 
organizations statute, which is virtually identical to the 
federal racketeering statute. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 911(b). Section 911 includes in particular perjury, false 
swearing in official matters, and tampering with official 
records as predicate activities which can lead to 
racketeering liability. See S 911(h)(1)(i) (" `Racketeering 
activity' means any act which is indictable under any of the 
following provisions of this title: . . . Chapter 49 (relating to 
falsification and intimidation)."); see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 4902(a) (defining perjury); S 4903 (defining false swearing 
in official matters); S 4911 (defining tampering with public 
records or information). 
 
In fact, the Commonwealth indicted Trone on state 
racketeering charges predicated on tampering with public 
records and perjury before the LCB. See App. at 99. These 
charges arose out of the same activities that the plaintiffs 
identify as the racketeering acts upon which their RICO 
claim is predicated. Although the indictment was dismissed,20 
this does not affect our ultimate conclusion that the 
Commonwealth could vindicate the public interest. The 
racketeering indictment charged Trone only with 
racketeering predicates in which he participated as a 
principal, and was dismissed because all but one of these 
was found wanting. But the indictment included perjury 
charges against others involved in the Beer World 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. See App. at 43. The court dismissed the tampering charges on the 
ground that they should have been brought under a more specific 
statute, the Liquor Code, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, S 4-436(j) (West 
1997), which makes false statements on liquor license applications a 
misdemeanor. See App. at 25-31. The alleged tampering therefore also 
could not serve as part of the pattern of racketeering activity necessary 
to support the racketeering charge, since Liquor Code violations are not 
specified as racketeering activities in section 911. See App. at 39 n.6; 
18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. S 911(h). Since the only remaining racketeering activity 
was one alleged instance of perjury on the part of Trone, the court 
concluded that there was no "pattern of racketeering activity" as required 
to support a racketeering charge. See App. at 40. 
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operations, which, like the remaining charge against Trone, 
were eventually nolle prossed. See App. at 98, 100. The 
indictment could have charged these other acts of perjury 
as predicates to the racketeering charge against Trone, 
which would have created the pattern of racketeering 
activity necessary to support a "little RICO" charge. 
 
Although the Commonwealth cannot now bring civil RICO 
claims against the defendants here, given the possibilities 
set forth above, we do not think this brings it outside the 
scope of the third Holmes factor. The Court's primary 
concern in Holmes was to ensure that some plaintiff be 
available to vindicate the law's "general interest in deterring 
injurious conduct." Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269. A civil RICO 
action is not specifically required to vindicate this general 
deterrence interest. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit 
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 172 F.3d 223, 235 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that the possibility of independent tort claims 
by smokers, or subrogated claims based thereon by union 
health funds, would be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the third Holmes factor). Although not 
providing for treble damages, we believe that the prospect 
of state criminal racketeering charges would provide an 
adequate deterrent to lawless conduct of the type alleged 
here to satisfy the concerns embodied in Holmes.21 
 
4. Summary: At all events, even to the ext ent that we 
have questions about whether the possibility of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Judge Wellford in his dissent contends that we cannot consider the 
wholesalers or the Commonwealth as potential alternative agents for the 
vindication of the public interest, because in this case none of them 
brought suit against Trone and the Beer World stores. We think this 
circumstance is irrelevant to determining whether the plaintiffs' injuries 
are too remote from the defendants' actions to be a proximate cause for 
the RICO claim. The post-injury actions of intervening parties cannot 
make the plaintiffs' losses more or less of a direct result of the 
defendants' actions. The only question is whether these intervening 
parties are ones that possibly could take steps to deter illegal activity 
as 
contemplated in Holmes. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70 ("[D]irectly 
injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as 
private attorneys general . . . ." (emphasis added)); 503 U.S. at 273 
("[T]hose directly injured . . . could be counted on to bring suit for the 
law's vindication . . . ."). 
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Commonwealth bringing criminal racketeering charges 
against Trone and the other defendants falls within the 
scope of the third Holmes factor, such questions cannot 
alter our ultimate conclusion, based on the Holmes factors 
as a whole, that proximate causation is lacking here. To 
paraphrase Steamfitters, "we are unconvinced that [the 
potential lack of alternative plaintiffs] is sufficient to 
overcome the concerns about apportioning damages and, 
most fundamentally, the remoteness of [the plaintiffs'] 
alleged RICO injuries from any wrongdoing on the part of 
[Trone]." Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 933-34. Considered as a 
whole, the Holmes factors dictate the conclusion that the 
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a proximate causal 
connection between their injuries and the defendants' 
alleged racketeering activities. 
 
D. Policy Issues: Were the Plaintiffs the Intended 
        Beneficiaries of the Liquor Code? 
 
The plaintiffs also contend that proximate causation is 
present in a civil RICO case where the alleged racketeering 
conduct effects violations of a regulatory regime designed to 
protect the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 878 
F. Supp. 744, 747-49 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Trautz v. Weisman, 
819 F. Supp. 282, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 
826-27 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing a similar principle in the 
context of state common-law fraud claims). Although this 
may be a valid principle, we find it inapposite in the 
present case, as the condition of its application is not 
present here. 
 
The purpose of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code is to 
promote temperance, not to protect small-business owners 
or ensure competition among beer retailers: 
 
         The provisions of [the Liquor Code] are intended to 
        create a system for distribution that shall include the 
        fixing of prices for liquor and alcohol and controls 
        placed on prices for malt and brewed beverages, and 
        each of which shall be construed as integral to the 
        preservation of the system, without which system the 
        Commonwealth's control of the sale of liquor and 
        alcohol and malt and brewed beverages and the 
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        Commonwealth's promotion of its policy of temperance 
        and responsible conduct with respect to alcoholic 
        beverages would not be possible. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, S 1-104(d) (West 1997) (emphasis 
added); see also S 1-104(a) ("This act shall be deemed an 
exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth for the 
protection of the public welfare, health, peace and morals of 
the people of the Commonwealth and to prohibit forever the 
open saloon . . . ."); Altshuler v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control 
Bd., ___ A.2d ___, No. 2126 C.D.1998, 1999 WL 298228, at 
*3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 13, 1999) ("The purpose of the 
Liquor Code is not to promote the sale of liquor, rather it is 
to regulate and restrain the sale of liquor."). At least one 
court has recognized that the Liquor Code was, in fact, not 
at all intended to protect the economic interests of liquor 
retailers. See Lancaster County Tavern Assn. v. 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 381 
(Lancaster Cty. C.P. Ct. 1980). 
 
The plaintiffs submit that even if the purpose of the 
Liquor Code is not to protect retailers like themselves, the 
effect of the Code, and one of the goals of the LCB in 
enforcing it, is to protect retailers and competition. But 
although the LCB's efforts to enforce the Code may have 
resulted largely in a predominance of beer retailers similar 
to the plaintiffs, that does not render large-scale stores like 
the Beer World stores automatically illegal. Accordingly, we 
do not think that the principle of Rodriguez, were we to 
adopt it, would compel a finding of proximate causation. We 
will therefore affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs' RICO claim. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court will be reversed to the extent that it granted 
summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiffs' 
antitrust claims, but affirmed in all other respects, and the 
case will be remanded to the District Court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
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WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part: 
 
I concur in Chief Judge Becker's excellent analysis of the 
antitrust claims of plaintiffs against the defendants. I 
therefore share in the conclusion that the district court was 
in error in granting summary judgment to defendants on 
the antitrust claims before the court. 
 
My disagreement is in respect to the treatment of the 
RICO claims. I dissent in that respect with some 
trepidation, realizing that Chief Judge Becker has recently 
authored several RICO decisions of this court flowing from 
the Supreme Court decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). I begin, then, with an 
analysis of Holmes in respect to the RICO issues in this 
case. 
 
First, however, I construe plaintiffs' RICO claim to be as 
follows: as an intended consequence of defendants' alleged 
predicate fraudulent actions and activities in attaining a 
special status as a Pennsylvania beer retailer/distributor 
and obtaining through that fraud from the state a special 
license and status (contrary to any legal entitlement), 
plaintiffs were economically damaged. The relevant cases 
discuss in the RICO context whether plaintiffs have 
standing to bring the claim against a defendant, and 
whether plaintiffs can establish commercial damages as a 
proximate cause of defendant's illegal predicate acts. 
 
Holmes involved the issue of standing and of proximate 
cause under RICO by a party asserting securities fraud. 
Plaintiff, Securities Investor Protection Corp. ("SIPC"), was 
neither a buyer nor a seller of alleged manipulated stocks 
orchestrated by defendants. SIPC sued seventy-five 
defendant broker/dealers whose alleged illegal predicate 
acts brought about the collapse of several brokerage 
concerns which were members of SIPC, causing it to pay 
millions in damages to the failed member brokerage 
houses. Holmes acknowledged that S 1964(c) of RICO was 
"modeled on the civil-action provision of the federal 
antitrust laws." Id. at 267. We agree that plaintiffs in this 
case have set out an antitrust claim that survives summary 
judgment treatment. Holmes interpreted proximate cause in 
its RICO analysis: 
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        At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects"ideas 
        of what justice demands, or of what is administratively 
        possible and convenient." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
        Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 
        S 41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984). . . . [One requirement is] 
        some direct relation between the injury asserted and 
        the injurious conduct alleged. 
 
Id. at 268. 
 
Was the plaintiff in Holmes simply complaining about 
"harm flowing merely from the misfortunates visited upon a 
third person by the defendant's acts . . ."? Id. Holmes held 
that SIPC was complaining about an indirect injury, but it 
is important to consider why it reached that result. First, 
Holmes noted in footnote 19 that SIPC was not claiming to 
sue under a claimed right of any customer who actually 
purchased the manipulated securities. Id. at 272 n.19. 
Second, it is important to note that in Holmes , the 
broker/dealers, directly defrauded, who went into 
bankruptcy "have in fact sued" the same defendants. Id. at 
273. Those third parties might then vindicate the public 
interest in recouping the economic damages caused by the 
fraudulent defendants, and in punishing them by treble 
damages. 
 
Because of the potential of multiple claims against 
defendants seeking damages as a direct result of the same 
illegal predicate acts and the necessity of difficult and 
complex apportionment, Holmes decided in favor of 
defendants that SIPC's damages claims did not meet the 
proximate cause test. Our case is a very different one 
factually from Holmes. Plaintiffs here assert actions arising 
from defendants' illegally attained status based on asserted 
fraud perpetrated on the state of Pennsylvania. This does 
not, in my view, vindicate the rights of private parties, such 
as plaintiffs, arising out of that fraud.1  Unlike defrauded 
third party customers who had also sued defendants for the 
RICO actions in Holmes, neither Fuhrer, nor any other 
master distributor, sought any such damages against the 
Trone defendants for the alleged illegal predicate activity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As Chief Judge Becker indicates, Pennsylvania may only seek criminal 
penalties and withdrawal of defendants' special license, not damages. 
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Indeed, Fuhrer denied that any such illegal activity took 
place, and is an alleged co-conspirator in the antitrust 
activity. 
 
In sum, I cannot construe Holmes as helpful to 
defendants in this case. Steamfitters Local Union Fund No. 
420 v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), I 
think, is distinguishable. In Steamfitters, customers or 
purchasers of the tobacco products had brought suit, or 
might be expected to bring suit, to vindicate plaintiff 's 
clearly indirect claim. These customers or purchasers had 
varying degrees of proximate contributory or comparative 
negligence or knowledge about the danger of the tobacco 
product used or sold to them. Respectfully, I do not believe 
plaintiffs' claims in the instant case to be as attenuated as 
in Steamfitters. It is closer to the standing and proximate 
causal relationship of plaintiff in Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1998), in my 
view. 
 
I do, therefore, respectfully dissent on the RICO element 
of this difficult case. I would hold that we should reverse 
and remand on both the antitrust and RICO claims. 
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